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ABSTRACT
Local elections consolidated the Mahinda Rajapaksa administration’s grip on power. 
State-led efforts to stimulate economic growth continued with major infrastructure 
projects in the northeastern and southern parts of Sri Lanka. No significant progress 
was made toward a political settlement and reconciliation with the Tamil community, 
and the government came under increasing international pressure about its conduct 
in the last months of the civil war after the release of the United Nations Advisory 
Panel report.
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 REGIME CONSOLIDATION AND POST-WAR ECONOMIC GROWTH
The United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) in 2011 continued the 
process of political centralization and regime consolidation in Sri Lanka. 
The administration retains a great deal of political capital and popularity as 
a result of its victory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). It 
seized this opportune moment to consolidate the unitary state, entrench a 
new political dynasty under President Mahinda Rajapaksa and his extended 
family, and neutralize the threat of militant Tamil nationalism and secession-
ism. Therefore, we see strong continuities between the “war for peace” and the 
“post-war” periods. This is reflected in the continued militarization of public 
life, the prominence of Sinhala nationalist rhetoric, and the channeling of 
political energies into securitized development in the northeast rather than 
political concessions to the Tamils. 
Jonathan Goodhand is Reader in Conflict and Development Studies in the Department of 
Development Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London. 
Email: <jg27@soas.ac.uk>.
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The UPFA administration has a strong popular mandate. This was clearly 
demonstrated at the ballot box in 2011 through local government elections 
for urban, divisional, and municipal councils, which were conducted in three 
stages in April, July, and October. The outcome was largely as predicted with 
the UPFA strengthening its grip on power at the local level, thus consoli-
dating gains made in the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2010. 
The UPFA won 271 councils (compared to 222 in 2006) and the United 
National Party (UNP) 31. The UPFA, on average, polled around 60% to 65% 
in Sinhalese-dominated areas, and the opposition UNP only infrequently 
polled over 40%.
Two setbacks to the government were the UNP’s victory in the Colombo 
municipal elections, and the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) winning 20 of 25 
seats on local councils in the north. As a result, the TNA now controls 32 local 
councils, making it the second largest party in terms of the number of local 
councils controlled. These results in the north were a blow to the Rajapaksa 
government, which viewed the polls as a referendum on its development-
oriented reconciliation efforts with the Tamils. The TNA consolidated its sta-
tus as the primary representative of the Tamils, thus increasing its legitimacy 
in any future negotiations on sharing power and post-war reconstruction. The 
TNA’s victory calls into question the efficacy of the Rajapaksa government’s 
attempt to gain the Tamils’ support through the granting of economic, as 
opposed to political, concessions. 
The UPFA’s continued popularity hinges upon rapid economic growth. Sri 
Lanka continues to experience a post-war boom, with a 7.4% growth rate pre-
dicted over the next five years. Furthermore, it is estimated that the economy 
will have grown by 8.1% in 2011. Sri Lanka also received the second tranche 
of an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan this year of US$200 million. 
Tourism continues to grow, and inflation has been kept under reasonable 
control at around 6.5%, which is predicted to fall to below 6% in 2012.1 The 
agricultural sector has been boosted by increased cultivation in the north and 
east. Investment in major infrastructural projects including roads, railways, 
ports, and power stations continues. Sri Lanka’s first expressway toll road 
linking the outskirts of Colombo to the southern city of Galle was opened in 
November 2011. Exports to other emerging markets, notably India, continue 
to grow. The business community, which had traditionally supported the 
1. Economist Intelligence Unit (2011), “Country Report: Sri Lanka,” London, December 2011.
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UNP, has largely aligned itself behind the UPFA administration. The 2011 
budget, with its simplification and cutting of taxes and reduction of bureau-
cracy surrounding investment, is largely viewed as being business friendly. 
Generally positive indicators aside, there concurrently remain longstand-
ing structural weaknesses in the economy including high debt-interest pay-
ments, a bloated civil service, and historically high budget deficits. A wide 
trade deficit means that another balance-of-payments crisis cannot be ruled 
out. The IMF assistance package focused on reducing the fiscal deficit, which 
necessitates cutting public spending, but there remains strong domestic pres-
sure to increase expenditure on the civil service and armed forces, which 
constitute important voter bases. The pressure for wage hikes and subsidies, 
which Rajapaksa promised during the 2010 presidential election campaign, 
is likely to increase over time. One manifestation of this was labor unrest in 
May and June 2011.
 Another sign of tension between economic liberalization and patrimonial 
politics was the expropriation bill and governmental nationalization of private 
enterprises, which raised concerns that the act was passed with undue haste 
and a lack of consultation, being shaped more by political concerns than 
economic efficiency. Both the Fitch Group and Moody’s Corporation, two 
major credit rating agencies, responded negatively. They indicated that the 
bill would erode investor confidence and potentially affect Sri Lanka’s invest-
ment rating. On another note, the government’s image was adversely affected 
by corruption. The shooting of a presidential election advisor, Bharatha 
Lakshman Premachandra, in Colombo reportedly by a fellow member of 
Parliament (MP) and party member, Duminda Silva, in October brought 
into the limelight a suspected growing nexus between politicians, deepening 
patronage, and organized crime. In spite of the government’s evident popu-
larity with the majority Sinhalese community, external relationships with 
Western countries continue to be strained over three interrelated issues: the 
rehabilitation of war-affected Tamil populations in the north and east, efforts 
to address Tamil political grievances, and war crimes and accountability.
 RECONSTRuCTION IN THE NORTH AND EAST
The government has staked its credibility on rapid economic development 
in the north and east of the country, which have large Tamil populations. 
There have been some notable achievements in these areas. These include the 
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resettlement of some 250,000 people (about 95% of all officially “internally 
displaced persons”), the construction of new infrastructure, improved agri-
cultural productivity, raised growth rates, and lowered costs of basic goods 
and services, inflated during the years of civil war by an economic blockade 
and LTTE taxation. 
However, reconstruction comes with a number of political strings attached. 
The rapid integration of the north and east is seen as a means of consolidat-
ing the unitary state and preventing the reemergence of Tamil militancy. In 
essence, it is viewed as a shortcut to security or as a means of obviating the 
need for a political settlement. These strategic concerns shape the logic and 
modalities of reconstruction, which have resulted in a highly centralized and 
militarized approach to development. The north comes under a highly cen-
tralized hybrid governance regime that blends various civilian and military 
structures. All humanitarian and reconstruction programs must go through 
a slow and restrictive process of vetting and clearance for access. 
Although official policy is about “normalization,” life in the north and east 
is far from normal because a de facto state of emergency remains in place. 
There has been a consolidation of military presence in these regions with 
the building of camps and the maintenance of a high number of military 
personnel. In Jaffna, for example, there are reportedly 40,000 army person-
nel and 10,000 police, in addition to various paramilitary groups and intel-
ligence agencies. Jaffna, in particular, has experienced waves of killings and 
abductions, and both housing and access to sustainable livelihoods remain a 
problem. Land issues are particularly contentious. In spite of the release of a 
government memorandum on land management, perceptions continue of the 
politicization and ethnicization of land. There are widespread fears of state-
sponsored land grabs for national security and development purposes, and 
allegations of an unofficial but government-sponsored policy of Sinhalization 
of these regions, including the promotion of Sinhalese immigration. Those 
living in the north and east have limited political voice or recourse to justice, 
and therefore lack the power to influence or shape development processes 
that are rapidly transforming the Tamil-majority region. 
One manifestation, perhaps, of popular feelings of powerlessness and in-
security has been the phenomenon of “grease devils”—naked or semi-naked 
men smeared in grease who are alleged to have sexually assaulted women 
throughout the island, particularly in the north and east. Reported attacks 
have frequently led to demonstrations and reprisals by the local population 
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against the security forces, who are accused of being the perpetrators or com-
plicit in the attacks. This has prompted a flurry of competing analyses and 
rumors about the causes and causers of violence. This phenomenon points to 
the post-war mutation of violence and a widespread distrust of the security 
establishment, leading to vigilantism and violent protests.  
 POLITICAL REFORM AND DEMOCRACY
There is limited domestic pressure for substantive reforms in the direction 
of devolution. The UPFA has close to a two-thirds majority in Parliament 
and also controls the levers of power at the local level. In contrast, the UNP 
is in disarray as a result of a protracted leadership crisis and a steady stream 
of defections to the governing coalition. Likewise, the Janatha Vimukthi 
Peramuna (JVP, People’s Liberation Front) has been affected by splits and 
leadership disputes. Its poor showing in the local elections (its share of seats 
declined from 378 to 76) indicate that the UPFA under Rajapaksa has become 
the dominant voice of Sinhala nationalism. Other parties that have histori-
cally played a king-making role, including the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress 
(SLMC) and Ceylon Workers’ Congress (CWC), are faced with the choice 
of either joining the coalition and benefiting from state patronage, in return 
for political acquiescence, or being consigned to the margins of the political 
sphere.
Therefore, in the absence of strong domestic pressure for change, there 
was no substantive progress during the year toward political reconciliation 
and state reforms to tackle the underlying causes of the conflict. Discussions 
around the implementation of the 13th Amendment of the Constitution have 
involved prevarication, and often divergent voices within government.2 For 
example, Foreign Minister G. L. Pieres made several statements affirming a 
commitment to political reforms, whereas Defense Secretary Gotabaya Raja-
paksa (who is President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s brother) stated that “the existing 
constitution is more than enough for us to live together. . . . Devolution-wise 
2. The 13th Amendment was passed in 1987 as a result of the Indo-Lanka Accord, which contained 
provisions for the creation of the Provincial Council System. This involved a substantial devolu-
tion of power to the Tamil-dominated north and east of the country. In practice, however, the 13th 
Amendment was never fully implemented.
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I think we have done enough; I don’t think there is a necessity to go beyond 
that.”3
In mid-August, a motion was tabled in Parliament to create a parliamen-
tary select committee including representatives of all political parties to find a 
political solution to the “national question.” The select committee was finally 
constituted in November with a stated remit to discuss a political settlement 
within six months. However, many observers see this as a delaying tactic, and 
the evidence suggests that power is moving in the opposite direction toward 
increased centralization and the removal of institutional constraints on the ex-
ecutive. Government efforts to control dissenting voices within the media and 
civil society also continued in 2011. For example, the offices of the newspaper 
Lanka-e News, which had been critical of the government, were burned down 
in an arson attack in January. Its website was blocked in October, as were a 
number of other private websites including some associated with the UNP. 
Even though emergency regulations, which had been in place since 1971, were 
allowed to lapse in August 2011, new regulations were incorporated into the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act. This continues to provide the government with 
a broad range of powers for arrest and detention, including the authority to 
detain persons indefinitely and without charge.
Post-war militarization of the public sphere also undermines the potential 
for democratic reform. High military spending continues, with an increase of 
6.3% forecast for the year 2011. The armed forces constitute the largest public-
sector employer. Military involvement in political and economic affairs has 
become more pervasive, not only in the north and east, but throughout 
the country. In April, Defense Secretary Rajapaksa announced that 70,000 
families identified as “slum dwellers” in Colombo would be relocated within 
two years. The process was widely seen as unjust, and coercively driven by the 
military and police, fostering the sense of a declining space for democratic 
politics in Sri Lanka. In November, the former army chief and presidential 
candidate Sarath Fonseka was sentenced to a further three years in prison, 
sending a clear warning to those seeking to challenge the government.4  
3. Interview with India Today (Mumbai), August 5, 2011, cited in Daily Mirror (London), 
“Gotabaya Hits Out,” August 8, 2011.
4. Fonseka was found guilty of making “false allegations” against Defense Secretary Gotabaya 
Rajapaksa and violating emergency regulations by “spreading rumours and causing public disorder.” 
He was already serving a 30-month prison term after a court martial convicted him of irregularities 
in military procurements. Another court martial earlier dishonorably discharged him for engaging 
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 WAR CRIMES AND ACCOuNTABILITY
The Rajapaksa government has largely been successful in neutralizing pressure 
from Western countries regarding the issue of war crimes and accountability. 
It has done this primarily by strengthening diplomatic and economic ties with 
countries such as China, India, and Japan, which have all declined to interfere 
in Sri Lanka’s internal politics. The government has also deflected external 
demands for accountability by pursuing its own “home-grown” version of 
reconciliation in the form of the Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Com-
mittee (LLRC). This body was established in August 2010 with a mandate to 
assess why the 2002 ceasefire between the government and LTTE broke down 
in 2008, leading to the subsequent resumption of violence.
However, in April 2011, the U.N. Advisory Panel report was released; it 
concluded that both government forces and the LTTE had conducted mili-
tary operations with “flagrant disregard for the protection, rights, welfare, 
and lives of civilians and failed to respect the norms of international law.”5 
It noted that as many as 40,000 Tamil civilians had been killed in the final 
months of the conflict, which ended in May 2009. It also criticized the role 
of the U.N., and found that the LLRC lacks the independence and witness-
protection capacity to serve as a legitimate accountability forum. The panel 
called on U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon to set up an independent 
international mechanism to monitor progress on accountability, act as a 
repository of information, and conduct its own investigations. Ban declined 
to establish such an organ without Sri Lanka’s consent.
The Sri Lankan government responded to the U.N. report with defiance, 
and the document appeared to do little to dent the Rajapaksa government’s 
domestic legitimacy. However, during the year a steady flow of damaging 
allegations and video evidence about the final months of the war came to 
light. The most influential of these was the Australian Channel 4 documen-
tary titled “The Killing Fields,” which showed harrowing scenes of atrocities 
that appeared to corroborate the U.N. report’s findings. The Sri Lankan 
government responded by releasing its own video called “Lies Agreed Upon,” 
which questioned the veracity of the documentary. On November 20, the 
in politics while being in active military service. Fonseka was stripped of his ranks and medals he 
earned during his 40-year career.
5. United Nations Advisory Panel, “Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on 
Accountability in Sri Lanka,” March 31, 2011, <http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/
POE_Report_Full.pdf>.
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final report of the LLRC was handed over to Rajapaksa, and released to Par-
liament on December 16. The report has won cautious praise from India, the 
U.S., and other countries for its analysis of the causes of the conflict and its 
recommendations on reconciliation and a political settlement. In contrast, it 
has been criticized by human rights groups and the TNA for failing to address 
questions of accountability and alleged wrong doings by the Sri Lankan mili-
tary. It is currently unclear how the president intends to utilize the report. 
 CONCLuSION
The UPFA government under President Rajapaksa has continued to consoli-
date its grip on power in Sri Lanka as a result of local elections. Enhanced 
stability has facilitated continued economic growth, and in the short term 
there are no significant challenges to the current government. The main 
drivers for change come from outside the country, mainly in the form of 
pressure from Western countries for political reforms and accountability on 
war crimes. However, this is unlikely to translate into significant conces-
sions from the government, and will therefore leave the underlying causes of 
conflict unaddressed.
